It’s a (mostly-)closed system: easy to send private messages inside, but complex or impossible to exchange encrypted emails with people not using ProtonMail.There’s no clear way to confirm that you are encrypting messages (only) to the right person.But it’s not the right choice for your org’s long-term communications security.īefore we get into any technical discussion, the straight-up dealbreakers for activists with ProtonMail are:
It might be OK for a quick fix when you need something more trustworthy than Gmail or Facebook Messenger. That said, please, please stop telling other activists to use it. We’re not saying it’s downright dangerous or totally insecure, or that we have a specific reason to distrust the developers. Can this be good enough for activists? Here, we take a look at easy-to-use ProtonMail–and why we at the CLDC can’t recommend it (or its security model) for people opposing the powerful.įirst off, if you currently rely on ProtonMail for your organizing, please don’t feel you need to quit using it straight away. This security model is offered by many Snowden-era startups claiming to provide digital security to the masses. In case of bear attack, you can feel secure knowing you can outrun your (former) friend. “You don’t have to outrun the bear” is a security model where you stay safe from predators on camping trips by taking your chain-smoking, out-of-shape buddy along.
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